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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
FRANKS. NAYLOR, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
RACHEL H. JOLLEY, HUGH K. 
JOLLEY and WILLIAM S. JOL-
LEY, Executors of the Last Will and 
Testament of REUBEN G. JOLLEY, 
Deceased; FRANCES MARION JOL-
LEY, HENRY C. JOLLEY, LILA 
JOLLEY JUELSTEIN, LEO V. 
JOLLEY, PEARL JOLLEY DAN-
IELS, HUGH K. JOLLEY and WIL-
LIAM S. JOLLEY, 
Respondents 
I 
Case No. 6232 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This action arose out of a real estate contract between 
R. G. Jolley, otherwise called Reuben G. Jolley, and Rachel 
H. Jolley, his wife, and Frank S. Naylor, the plaintiff and 
appellant herein. 
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2 
By the terms of this contract, R. G. Jolley and Rachel 
H. Jolley, his wife, agreed to sell, and Frank S. Naylor 
agreed to buy certain real property located in Utah County 
and described in the agreement of sale and purchase. 
This agreement was dated and executed on February 
19, 1930, and is referred to and designated in this case as 
Exhibit " A," the same having been attached to the plaint-
iff's complaint. 
The consideration named in said instrument to be paid 
the J alleys by plaintiff and appellant was $8,000.00, pay-
able in installments as follows: 
$2,000.00 to be paid at the time of the execution of 
the agreement, which payment was acknowledged to have 
been received in said agreement. 
The balance of said consideration, $6,000.00, was to 
be paid in six annual installments of $1,000.00 each, first 
installment to be paid November 30, 1931; interest at six 
per cent per annum on all deferred payments; payable an-
nally from date of agreement, and $1,000.00 on the prin-
cipal was to be paid on each November 30 thereafter until 
the entire purchase price should be paid, the last install-
ment falling due on November 30, 1936. 
This agreement also provided for the sellers furnish-
ing, at their own expense, an abstract of title to the prop-
erty, which was to be furnished oil or before October 1, 
1930, showing a marketable title. The purchaser was to 
have thirty days after the same was furnished to exam-
ine and accept title thereto. 
This agreement also provided that if the abstract dis-
closed any clouds or defects in the title, and that the pur-
chaser's attorney should be the judge as to whether or not 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
any clouds or defects existed, anu in the event that any 
clouds or defects should be found to exist, the sellers 
should clear up such clouds and defects at their own ex-
pense within and before the first day of October, 1930. 
It is apparent that the last provision is ambiguous 
and uncertain; however, the parties presumably consid-
ered that matter and obviated the difficulty by a subse-
quent modification of said agreement. 
That on January 28, 1932, two other agreements, modi-
fying the original agreement were entered into. These 
agreements \vere designated Exhibit " B " and Exhibit 
"C," references to \Vhich will hereafter be more particu-
larly made. 
The subsequent agreernents disclose that nothing was 
paid by the purchaser on said agreement prior to January 
28, 1932, although the first installment of $1,000.00 and 
interest in the sum of $360.00, fell due on November 30, 
1931. And it is further apparent that some defects in the 
title of the property described in the original agreement 
had been discovered, and at least one defect had been 
cleared up before that date, as is sho\vn by Entry 24 in 
defendants' Exhibit 1, being Abstract No. 14, 953, show-
ing a decree of distribution in the rna tter of the estate of 
Cyrus Sanford, deceased, decreeing the legal title to a por-
tion of said property to R. G. J alley. 
Other defects in, or clouds upori the title to the prop-
erty described in the original agreement were also dis-
covered or known to the parties prior to January 28, 1932, 
the same being pointed out in said Exhibit "B" and Ex-
hihit "C" hereinabove mentioned. 
Exhibit "B," designated "Memorandum of Agree-
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ment,'' after referring generally to the description of the 
lands as contained in the original agreement states: 
"And, Whereas, said R. G. Jolley has heretofore 
sold or agreed to sell two certain lots adjoining what 
is commonly known as Kelly's Grove; 
And, Whereas, the description of the property 
agreed to be sold covers the said lots; 
And, Whereas, George G. Kelly, now deceased, 
was the owner of an undivided one-fifth interest of 
the property described in said agreement of sale be-
t\veen the parties hereto as 481.33 acres less 11.97 
acres more or less sold therefrom as described in said 
agreement; 
And. Whereas, the predecessors in interest of the 
undersigned R. G. Jolley, to-wit: one Cyrus N. San-
ford, on or about the 16th day of May, 1911, made a 
certain deed conveying to Knight Investment Com-
pany, a corporation, the mineral rights in special sec-
tions 71 and 72 in Section 33, Township 7 South of 
Range 4 East of Salt Lake Base and Meridian;" 
Exhibit " B," after the preliminary statement therein, 
concludes as follows: 
''It Is Now Therefore Between The Parties Here-
by Agreed As Follows, To-wit: 
That the title to the lots agreed to be sold by the 
undersigned R:. G. Jolley hereinabove referred to, 
shall be deemed to be covered by the contract hereto-
fore made and entered into between the parties here-
to and said R. G. Jolley shall transfer such title or 
titles to the undersigned Frank S. Naylor under the 
said contract and as a part of the real property there-
in described. 
And it is further agreed that the undersigned R. 
G. Jolley will secure a deed from the Knight Invest-
ment Company to the mineral rights in the said special 
sections 71 and 72, in Section 33, Township 7 South of 
Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Meridian, and that such 
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mineral rights shall be transferred to the undersigned 
Frank S. Naylor as in the said contract provided, when 
said lands shall be transferred to the said Frank S. 
Naylor under said agreement. 
It is further agreed that R. G. Jolley may trans-
fer and assign to the administratrix of the estate of 
George G. Kelly, deceased, or to the heirs at law of 
George G. Kelly, or their assigns, or to any person 
entitled thereto, the west one-fifth of the property in 
said contract described and agreed to be sold, which 
is located in Section 32, Township 7 South of Range 
4 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, which 
said one-fifth is specifically described as follows, to-
\Vit: 
Beginning North 0 deg. 4' West 7 chains from the 
Southwest corner of Section 32, Township 7 South 
of Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and Me-
ridian; thence North 67 deg. 45' East 13.53 chains; 
thence North 65 deg. 55' East 0.92 chains; thence 
North 67.50 chains to the Notrh boundary of said 
Section 32; thence West 13.56 chains to the North-
west corner of said Section 32; thence South 73.00 
chains to the place of beginning, containing an 
area of 93.87 acres more or less. 
As to the real estate hereinabove specifically described 
which the said R. G. Jolley may transfer to the ad-
ministratrix of the estate of George G. Kelly, or other 
persons entitled thereto, the said contract shall be in-
operative. 
It is further understood and agreed that Frank S. 
Naylor will. pay any and all taxes, assessments, and 
water charges on the premises agreed to be sold falling 
due after the year 1929. 
This memorandum of agreement shall have the 
same force and effect as though the same were writ-
ten into and a part of the said contract between the 
parties hereto under date of the 19th day of February, 
1930. 
Dated Provo City, Utah, January 28, 1932. 
(Signed) R. G. Jolley 
'' R. H. Jolley 
" Frank S. Naylor 
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On the same day January 28, 1932, Exhibit "C" was 
entered into by these same parties, which reads as follows: 
Provo, Utah, Jan. 28, 1932 
It is agreed between the undersigned that except 
as the contract of Feb. 19, 1930 is modified by the 
attached memorandum the same shall be in full force 
and effect. It is agreed that there is now due to the 
undersigned R. G. Jolley under the terms of the said 
contract the sum of $1000.00 principal and $360.00 in-
terest to Nov. 30, 1931; that the undersigned FrankS. 
Naylor is entitled to credit thereon as follows: 
Kelley taxes $20.00; Water tax $7.50; account of 
note favor of Maxfield and assigned to Naylor the sum 
of $150.00; total credit of $177.50, leaving _a balance 
due on the Nov. 1931 installment under the contract 
of principal and interest in the sum of $1182.50. 
It is agreed that said Naylor shall pay in cash at 
this time $882.50, and that the balance of the said sum 
to-wit the sum of $300.00 will be deposited within 10 
days after this date with the Zions Savings Bank and 
Trust Co. of Salt Lake City to the credit of R. G. Jolley 
to be paid to him on exhibition of an abstract of title 
showing a deed from Knight Investment Co. to R. G. 
Jolley to the mineral rights to special sections 71 and 
72 in Section 33, Township 7 South of Range 4 East, 
S. L. M., together with a deed from Henry Weight and 
wife, and a deed from Dallas Holley and wife for lands 
heretofore deeded to the said Weight and Holley in 
special sections 71 and 72 hereinabove referred to. It 
is understood that the abstracts of the property sold 
will be brought down to date; that the purchaser shall 
have same for examination for a period of 5 days for 
the purpose of checking titles, and same shall be deliv-
ered to R. G. Jolley; the rights of the parties respecting 
title as agreed in the original contract are not affected 
. hereby. 
(Signed) R. G. Jolley 
" R. H. Jolley 
" Frank S. Naylor" 
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Shortly after executing Exhibits "B" and "C" Naylor 
was given the possession of the abstract and kept the same 
for son1e time and then returned it toR~. G. Jolley, and then 
paid the $300.00 as stipulated. (Trans. 97) 
Nothing further seems to have occurred between the 
parties as far as shown by the record until July 5, 1933, 
at \Vhich time Naylor made a payment on the contract of 
$20.00, and from then until July 21, 1936, small payments 
were made from tin1e to time aggregating in all less than 
$1,000.00, the last payment being in the sum of $14.30. 
(Trans. 101-102) 
On 1\Iovember 30, 1932, there became due under the 
agreen1ent bet\veen the parties $1,000.00 principal and 
$300.00 L~ interest and each year thereafter until Novem-
ber 30, 1936, $1,000.00 and interest on $5,000.00 fell due, 
so that on November 30, 1936, the entire obligation was 
past due and payable and only approximately $1,000.00 had 
b~en paid and at no time during that period has there been 
payments sufficient made to equal the past due interest, 
say nothing of the principal. 
During the life of this agreement Naylor had failed to 
pay the taxes and the assessments on the water and the 
insurance on the buildings upon the property to an amount 
of approximately $800.00, and the executors of the R. G. 
Jolley estate had been compelled to pay the same in order 
to protect the title of said property. (Trans. 107.) 
On March 11, 1937, Naylor, not having made any more 
payments and having been in possession of the property 
covered by the agreements, notice was served upon him by 
the executors of the R. G. Jolley estate demanding pay-
ment of the amount due under· the contract, including taxes, 
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assessments, and insurance payments, and notifying plain-
tiff and appellant herein that unless he made payment of 
the same within 45 days from the date of such notice, his 
right to the possession of the said property would be ter-
minated and the agreement declared null and void. (Trans. 
32-33; Abstract 30-31-32-33) 
Not receiving any response or payment from the plain-
tiff and appellant herein, said executors on May 20, 1937, 
again served notice upon said Naylor and demanded the 
immediate possession of the property covered by the agree-
ment. (Trans. 34; Abstract 33) 
Again nothing was heard from the plaintiff and appel-
lant and he continued to maintain possession of said prop-
erty until about the 4th of June, 1937, when it appears that 
Mr. Naylor came to Provo and brought with him J. W. 
Stringfellow and called upon Attorney Straw of the firm of 
Christenson, Straw and Christenson, and they told Mr. 
Straw that the plaintiff and appellant had a buyer and they 
wished to take the abstract to the property, and it was 
claimed that Mr. Straw called up someone, presumably 
Hugh Jolley, and talked to him about getting the abstract, 
but they failed to get the abstract, and they then returned 
to Salt Lake, with the understanding that Mr. Straw would 
obtain the abstract and mail to Attorney Stringfellow, but 
that was not done. (Trans. 27-32; Abstract 37-44) 
All this evidence went in over the objection of the de-
fendants on the ground that it was incompetent and im-
material. 
Nothing further was heard from Mr. Naylor with re-
spect to making payments or otherwise until suit was com-
menced on September 9, 1938. 
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Again on August 16, 1937, not having heard further 
from Mr. Naylor the executors and Mrs. Jolley caused 
notice to be served upon the plaintiff and appellant, Ex-
hibit "F", notifying him of his default and of the amount, 
principal .::nd interest, and taxes, assessments, and insur-
ance claimed due and unpaid under the terms of said agree-
ment, together \Vtih the interest thereon, and in addition 
thereto said notice contained the following: 
"You are hereby required to make any and all 
payments agreed in the said agreement to be made by 
you, both as to principal and interest and taxes, as-
sessments, and insurance against said lands, and any 
amounts due and unpaid as assessments against water 
rights used in connection with or on said lands so 
agreed to be sold and to pay the whole thereof on or 
before thirty days from and after the date of this 
notice and its service upon you, and in the event of 
your failure to pay any and all such an1ounts in which 
you are in default within said period of thirty days, 
then your interest in the said contract and in the said 
land and water rights agred to be sold, shall be~ and 
is hereby declared forfeited as by the terms of said 
contract is specifically required, and you will be re-
quired to make delivery of said lands and property to 
the undersigned as executor of the Last v'lill and Tes-
tament of R. G. Jolley, deceased, and to the under-
signed Rachel Jolley, as is in said contract specifically 
provided; and if you fail to comply with the demands 
made upon you under this notice and fail to pay up 
the said contract in full within thirty days from the 
date of the service of this notice upon you, then the 
said contract shall be and is hereby declared void and 
of no further force or effect, and you will be and are 
hereby required to deliver up the said premises and 
the whole thereof to the undersigned at the end of said 
thirty days unless said payments have been made. 
TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned are hereby 
ready, able, and willing to comply with the terms of 
said agreement in full, and to make the transfers of 
the property under the said agreement as therein pro-
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vided, and will, at any time during the said period of 
thirty days mentioned in this notice, make such trans-
fers as are required by the terms of said agreement 
upon tender of the purchase price of the said premises 
hereinabove described. 
Rachel H. Jolley 
and 
Hugh ·K. Jolley 
William S. Jolley 
As Executors of the Last Will and Testament of 
R. G. Jolley, Deceased. 
(Trans. 35-36; Abstract 33) 
And again on September 17, 1937, Exhibit "G", notice 
was served upon said plaintiff and appellant by the execu-
tors of said estate, and Rachel H. Jolley, in words and 
figures as follows: 
To Frank S. Naylor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TAKE NOTICE: That on account of your failure 
to comply with the notice heretofore s.erved upon you 
by the undersigned on the 16th day of August, 1937, 
and on account of your defaults under the contract be-
tween yourself and R. G. Jolley and Rachel H. Jolley, 
under date of February 19, 1930, Rachel H. Jolley and 
the undersigned, administrators of the estate of R. G. 
Jolley, deceased, do hereby notify you that they here-
by elect to declare and do declare the said contract 
entered into by yourself and the said R. G. Jolley and 
Rachel H. Jolley under date of February 19, 1930, void 
and of no further force and effect, as the said con-
tract specifically provides; and the undersigned do 
hereby require and demand from you the possession 
of the real property, described in said agreement, and 
the whole thereof. 
Hugh K. Jolley 
William S. Jolley 
Rachel H. Jolley 
As Executors of the Esta~e of R. G. Jolley, deceased. 
(Trans. ~7; Abstract 33) 
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That thereafter the said Rachel H. Jolley and the 
executors of the estate of R. G. Jolley, deceased, took pos-
session of the said property in the fall of 1937, and that 
without any further notice, this action \Vas commenced on 
September 9, 1938. 
Exhibit "C" hereinbefore referred to was executed 
January 28, 1932, and in accordance with a stipulation 
therein contained, R. G. Jolley should obtain certain deeds, 
one from the Knight Investment Company, one from Henry 
Weight and -\vife, and one from Dallas Holley and wife, 
pending the payment of the balance of $300.00 by the plain-
tiff and appellant, to him, and have delivered to said plain-
tiff and appellant an abstract showing such conveyances. 
Defendants' Exhibit 1, is the Abstract No. 14,953, exhibited 
as required, and it sho\vs all of said deeds to have been se-
cured and recorded as of February 1, 1932, as shown by 
this contract, and the same was delivered to the plaintiff 
and appellant who retained it for some time, when it was 
returned and delivered toR. G. Jolley, and the $300.00 paid. 
(Trans. 97, 118-119; Abstract ) 
The plaintiff and appellant testified that he was un-
able to pay for the property unless he could sell it and 
thereby secure funds to pay for the property as provided 
in the contract and he further testified that he was a bank-
rupt and about the time of the commencement of this ac-
tion, he took out bankruptcy proceedings and testified at 
the first meeting of creditors as follows: 
"Q. You stated, did you not, in your report to the 
bankruptcy court that the reason you lost this prop .. 
erty was because you couldn't pay for it? 
A. I don't remember whether I stated that or 
not. 
Q. Well, we will see whether you didn't say this 
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-I will ask you if you did not make this statement 
under oath, i~ response to this question: 
'Question: You have a suit pending against 
Rachel H. J alley and Hugh K. J alley and William 
S. J alley, executors of the last will and testament 
of Reuben G. Jolley, and others, in the District 
Court of Utah County, for damages growing out 
of breach of contract for the purchase of approxi-
mately 317 acres of land, wherein you pray for 
judgment in the sum of $8,152. Do you think 
you will be able to collect any money in this mat-
ter? 
'Answer: I don't know whether I can col-
lect anything or not. That suit is still pending. 
They took the land away from me. It was bought 
under contract and I was unable to fill the con-
tract, and they came and took possession of the 
place.' 
You stated that, did you not? 
A. Yes, sir.'' 
(Trans. 90; 98 to 100.) 
The plaintiff and appellant has at no time since No-· 
vember 30, 1932, and up to the ·time of the commencing of 
the action in this case, September 9, 1938, paid or offered 
to pay the arrears due under said contract of agreement, 
and that at no time has he offered the amount due under 
said contract or tendered said amount due, or any amount, 
after November 30, 1936, the date when the entire con-
tract price became due and payable. J. W. Stringfellow 
testified that on or about June 4, 1937, he had told Straw, 
the attorney for the executors of the estate of R. G. Jol-
ley, deceased, that the plaintiff and appellant had a good 
faith purchaser for the property, and that if he could get 
the abstracts at that time a sale could be consummated, 
or words to that effect, and that Straw had failed to de-
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liver to him the abstracts. Mr. Stringfellow, among other 
things, \vith respect to that matter, testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, you said that Mr. Naylor exhibited to 
you a notice? 
A. Ye.s A notice that purported to be a-
Q. Demand of payment? 
A. Demand of payment. Yes, a demand of pay-
ment of arrears. I am not sure that that notice, Mr. 
Christenson-If I recall right, it was what I call a 
rather ambiguous notice, one that I did not consider 
\Vas, as a n1atter of law, a notice of forfeiture\ 
Q. Would you recognize the notice? 
A. Oh, I don't know that I would, because they 
are drawn largely in the-they are drawn-so much 
similarity to them, but-
Q. You said this was on the fourth of June? 
A. Well, I was down here the day previous to 
having received that letter. This notice that was, that 
Mr. Naylor brought in to me probably was brought in, 
oh, a week or probably even more than that prior to 
my coming down here. I wouldn't be positive on a 
thing like that. 
Q. You don't know but vvhat it might be dated 
on May 20, 1937? Don't you remember that? 
A. No, I wouldn't. I recall as to the date when 
I was here merely from the date that was on· the let-
ter I received following my visit here. And I know, as 
a matter of fact that that was the following day to 
my being here. 
Q. Now, you stated that you demanded the ab-
stract of title, showing good title to this land less the 
ninety-three acres? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if they would give you a good abstract 
of title, you intended to sell the property and pay out? 
A. Yes. We told him we had· a purchaser. 
Q. Now, that is all you know about it. Nobody 
had put up the money for it? 
A. Well, I can only answer that-from my per-
sonal knowledge. I say nobody. But I have infor-
mation about it. 
Q. You didn't have any personal knowledge? 
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A. Wasn't personal knowledge of mine. 
Q. It was something Mr. Naylor told you, that 
he had a good faith purchaser? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is all you knew about it? 
A. Yes.'' 
(Transcript 37-38) 
This conversation took place a long time after the en-
tire obligation had become due and payable, and while the 
plaintiff and appellant was in arrears over $6,000.00, and 
after he had been notified at least twice that the contract 
would be terminated unless he made payment of the 
amount due. 
The record further shows that on the 4th day of Sep-
tember, 1934, an order was made and entered by the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, 
Utah, authorizing the executors of the estate of R. G. Jol-
ley, deceased, to transfer to the administratrix of the es-· 
tate of George G. Kelly, deceased, the 93.87 acres of land 
described in Exhibit "B," heretofore referred to, and that 
on the 14th day of July, 1937, the deed in accordance with 
said order was made and delivered, and on the first day of 
September, 1934, an order was made and entered by the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County, 
Utah, in the Matter of the Estate of George G. Kelly, de-
ceased, authorizing the administratrix of said estate to 
deed to Hugh K. Jolley and William S. Jolley, as execu-
tors of the Last Will and Testament of R. G. Jolley, de-
ceased, a quit-claim deed to the balance of the land in 
Section 32 covered by the contract of sale entered into 
between said Naylor and Jolleys, which deed was accord-
ingly executed by said administratrix on the 23rd day of 
July, 1937. ((Trans. 39-43) 
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The foregoing is substantially the state of the record 
except , as to the evidence relative to claimed damages 
which defendants claim to be immaterial, as the plaintiff 
has shown no right to recover in this case under the plead-
ings and proof. 
lYiotion to strike the evidence with respect to plaint-
iff's damages \vas, ho\vever, made and by the Court over-
ruled. (Trans. 69.) 
POINTS, AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENTS 
The plaintiff claims that the Court erred in granting 
a non-suit, and bases the claim entirely upon the alleged 
failure of the defendants and their predecessor in interest, 
R. G. Jolley, to furnish to the plaintiff an abstract of title 
as set forth in the original agreement, and that on account 
of such failure the defendants would not be authorized to 
legally terminate the agreement. 
And that inasmuch as the agreement was terminated 
and the defendants took possession of the property in-
volved, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover back all 
of the payments made, and alleged damages. 
The contention is then made by the plaintiff that, in-
asmuch as the defendants did not furnish the abstract of 
title as provided for in the original agreement, the de-
fendants became in default and have remained in default 
during all the times thereafter, and at the time of the at-
tempted termination of said agreement. 
The record in this case does not uphold such a con-
tention, as we construe that record. There~~ no evidence 
in this case that R. G. Jolley, during his lifetime, did not 
st 1bmit an abstract of title to the plaintiff, as was contem· 
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plated by the original agreement of sale, but, on the con-
trary, it appears conclusively that such abstract of title 
was delivered to the plaintiff. This perhaps, does not ap-
pear expressly, but it does appear by Entry Number 24, 
in plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Abstract No. 14,953, that on March 
7, 1930, a decree of distribution was obtained and recorded 
clearing up a defect in the title to Special Section 72, in 
Section 33, Township 7 South, Range 4 East of the S. L. M., 
which was a part of the land contracted to be sold to the 
plaintiff, and it does appear conclusively that between the 
date of the original· contract and January 28, 1932, that 
all of the claimed defects in or clouds upon the title of the 
lands contracted to be sold were known to the plaintiff, 
and that on the 28th day of January, 1932, that fact was 
distinctly set out in defendants' Exhibit " B," and that at 
that time an ~ntirely new provision, with respect to the 
title or abstract of title was entered into between the 
plaintiff and R. G. Jolley and his wife. 
There were four defects or clouds upon the title to 
these lands set out in Exhibit " B," designated "Memoran-
dum of Agreement," and further clarified or amplified by 
Exhibit "C," made between the same parties on the same 
day. 
Those defects consisted of two conveyances thereto-
fore made, one to Henry Weight, dated October 11, 1929, 
and recorded February 7, 1930, Entry No. 20, in plaint-
iff's Exhibit 1, hereinabove referred to; 
And one to Dallas Holley, dated October 11, 1929, and 
recorded May 6, 1930, Entry No. 18, in plaintiff's Exhibit 
1. 
These conveyances consisted of two small lots, a part 
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of the lands described in the original contract, designated 
Exhibit " A." 
Another defect consisted of a deed to mineral rights 
executed by the predecessor in interest of R. G. Jolley to 
Knight Investment Company, dated May 13, 1911, and re-
corded 1\IIay 16, 1911, sho\vn by Entry 4 in plaintiff's Ex-
hibit 1. 
These three defects or clouds were upon the lands 
designated Special Sections 71 and 72, Section 33, Town-
ship 7 South, Range 4 East, S. L. M. The other cloud or 
defect had reference to that part of the land described in 
the original agreement, located in Section 32, Township 
7 South, Range 4 East of the S. L. B. and Meridian, and 
consisting of 481.35 acres, and it arose out of the fact that 
the estate of George G. Kelly, deceased, had an undivided 
one-fifth interest in said 481.35 acres. 
It will be remembered that the contract originally 
entered into provided that abstract of title should be de-
livered to the plaintiff to be examined, and if defects of 
title should be found, and the attorney of the plaintiff was 
to be the judge as to whether or not clouds or defects ex-
isted against the title, then the sellers should clear that 
title. 
· It further appears from Exhibit " B " that the undi-
vided one-fifth interest had been determined prior to Janu-
ary 28, 1932, as that one-fifth interest is specifically de-
scribed in said Exhibit "B," so that it must be apparent 
that there had been some negotiations and some work 
done in ascertaining the exact description that should be 
conveyed to the George G. Kelly estate, or to the adminis-
tratrix, prior to the said 28th day of January, 1932. 
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The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that R. G. 
Jolley had submitted an abstract of title to the plaintiff, 
or his attorney, if he had one, and it was determined that 
these defects above mentioned existed. 
Then it was, that on January 28, 1932, R. G. Jolley 
and his wife and Frank S. Naylor, the plaintiff, entered 
into the memorandum of agreement designated Exhibit 
"B," and the agreement designated Exhibit " C," in which 
all these defects were specifically provided for, and a def-
inite agreement entered into with respect thereto. 
It will further be observed by an examination of those 
two Exhibits that R. G. Jolley should obtain conveyances 
from Henry Weight and his wife and Dallas Holley and his 
wife to the two lots theretofore conveyed to them, and that 
he should obtain a conveyance from the Knight Invest-
ment Company to the mineral rights theretofore conveyed 
to the said Knight Investment Company, by a predecessor 
in interest of R. G. Jolley, and that· said R. G. Jolley should 
exhibit an abstract of title showing those conveyances to 
have been made. 
It is admitted by the plaintiff in this case that he re-
ceived said abstract, and that he retained it a number of 
days, and then returned it to R. G. Jolley, as provided in 
Exhibit " C," and that he then paid $300.00 that he should 
pay if he was satisfied \Vith the title up to that time. 
Those facts are all shown by defendants' Exhibit 1. 
As to the one-fifth interest to be· conveyed to the ad-
ministratrix of the George G. Kelly estate, and as to the 
clearing of the title to that land, no definite time was men-
tioned. The record in this case shows that plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "A," which is the original agreement, was recorded 
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on July 21st, 1930, and, of course, there was no danger 
of having any clouds placed upon the title to the property 
other than those that existed on January 28, 1932. And 
for that reason, no doubt, the question of the conveying 
of the one-fifth interest, as described, to the George G. 
Kelly estate, and to get a conveyance from the George G. 
Kelly estate, to m G. Jolley or his successors, was left 
\vithout any specific time, except that it was provided that 
these conveyances should be made and the record cleared, 
so that said property described in the original agreement, 
except as modified, should be conveyed to Mr. Naylor, when 
he had completed the payment as provided for in this 
agreement and in the memorandum of agreement. 
It is here apparent that it was not intended by Ex-
hibit "C" that R. G. Jolley should have the conveyance of 
th~ one-fifth interest made to the administratrix of the 
George G. Kelly estate and a conveyance from said estate 
to R. G. Jolley of the four-fifths within the time that the 
plaintiff was to examine the title to ascertain if the lots 
and the mineral rights had been conveyed, because that 
\Vas to be done before the payment of the $300.00 which 
the plaintiff withheld pending his examination of the ab-
stract showing such conveyances, and after he was satis-
fied that the conveyances has been made and the title was 
satisfactory, he should pay the $300.00, which he did some 
time within a week or three \veeks, as testified to by the 
plaintiff himself. (Trans. 97.) 
The plaintiff cannot nO\\-" be permitted to base any 
error upon the fact that there were defects in the title to 
the property as described in the original agreement of 
sale. 
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His conduct and his contract are entirely inconsistent 
with any such claim. 
McAlpine v. Reicheneker, 42 Pac. 339 
Mitchell v. Hughes, et al, 157 Pac. 965 
66 Corpus Juris, Section 669, Page 964. 
Drollinger v. Carson, 155 Pac. 923 
DEFAULTS OF THE PLAINTIFF IN CARRYING OUT 
I-IIS PART OF THE CONTRACT 
The evidence discloses conclusively that after Febru-
ary 19, 1930, the plaintiff made no payment whatever, 
prior to January 28, 1932, although $1,560.00 became due 
and payable on November 28, 1931, but, of course, that 
default was waived and settled on January 28, 1932, the 
same as any other matter with respect to the title to the 
property, or with respect to the payments to have been 
made by the plaintiff, prior to that date. 
It is further shown, without conflict or dispute; that 
on November 30, 1932, there b~came due and payable 
from the plaintiff to the Jolleys, $1,500.00 but the same 
was not paid, and no payment at all was offered or made 
until July 5, 1933, when the plaintiff paid $20.00, and from 
that time on until November 30, 1936, when the entire 
purchase price did become due and payable under the 
terms of the agreement, the plaintiff made but small pay-
ments, the last of which was made on July 21, 1936, being 
$14.30; all of the payments that were made by the plaint· 
iff after January 28, 1932, amounted to less than $1,000.00 
The record further shows that after January 28, 1932, 
the defendant paid no taxes whatever upon the land, no 
water assessments, or other special .taxes, or insurance 
premiums, and that during that time, in order to protect 
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the title, the defendants were required to pay approxi-
mately $800.00 for school purposes. 
At no time before the payment of the entire considera-
tion was in default, did the plaintiff ever pay or offer to 
pay. or in any way attempt to make a settlement with the 
defendants. During all of the time from February 19, 
1930, and up to October, 1937, plaintiff had the possession 
and received the income and profits from the place, a per-
iod of eight producing seasons. 
On March 11, 1937, the plaintiff was notified of his 
defaults, and he was advised that unless he paid the entire 
amount due, including interest, assessments and taxes, 
\Vithin 45 days, his contract would be nullified. The record 
shows that the plaintiff received that notice and paid ab-
solutely no attention to it. 
He was again notified on May 20, after the 45 days 
and more had elapsed, that inasmuch as he had not taken 
care of the defaults or made and arrangements, or made 
any payments, the contract was nullified, and possession 
was demanded. 
After this notice of termination and the demand for 
possession, the plaintiff appeared upon the scene on or 
about June 4, 1937, with one J. W. Stringfellow, and called 
upon M. R. Straw, attorney who was handling the business 
with respect to tpe estate of R. G. Jolley, and he was ad-
vised orally that the plaintiff had a prospective purchaser 
for the property covered by the contract, and that he 
wished the abstract of title, and that Straw called up one 
of the executors and told him the desire of Mr. Naylor, 
and his attorney, but apparently the executor did not care 
to go any further at that time without anything more sub-
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santial than a promise of a prospective buyer; the buyer 
was never produced nor any contract, or writing submitted. 
Mr. Straw did not get the abstract, and wrote Mr. String-
fellow to that effect, that he could not deliver the abstract 
at that time, but that if the plaintiff really had a bona fide 
purchaser, and desired to take up the deal, he would as-
sist in that matter. No authority of Mr. Straw was 
shown to permit him to waive any rights of defendants. 
From that thne on until suit was commenced, not 
one word was heard from the plaintiff. 
On August 16, 1937, the defendants, the executors 
and Mrs. Jolley notified the plaintiff again that he was in 
default, and that they were ready and willing and able to 
make the proper transfer to the plaintiff if he would pay 
up as provided by the contract. The plaintiff absolutely 
made no answer, or no offer or no indication that he was 
interested in taking up this contract. He was given thirty 
days by this notice of August 16. 
After the thirty days were up, the defendants, the 
executors, and Mrs. Jolley notified the plaintiff that the 
contract was nullified, and demanded possession, and, later 
in October, 1937, they took possession of the property, and 
on September 9, 1938, the next time plaintiff was heard 
from, he brought this action. 
The plaintiff bases his right to recover upon the al-
leged refusal of M. R. Straw, the attorney for the execu-
tors of the estate of R. G. Jolley, deceased, to deliver an 
abstract of title to the plaintiff for examination on June 
4, 1937, upon the pretense that at that time the plaintiff 
had a purchaser that would enable him, if he got the ab-· 
stract, to obtain money sufficient to pay in full. 
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This was about seven ·months after his entire con-
tract was in default, and after he had been served with 
notice dated March 11, 1937, that unless he paid all the 
amounts due under the agreement, including principal, in-
terest, taxes, assessments, etc., within 45 days, that his 
contract would be forfeited, and after he had been served 
\vith notice on May 20, 1937, that his contract had been 
nullified, as provided therein, due to his defaults, and pos-
session of the premises had been demanded of him. At that 
time, bet\veen $7,000.00 and $8,000.00 remained unpaid by 
the plaintiff. 
In the first place, there is no evidence to show that 
Mr. Stra\v, atttorney for the executors, and now deceased, 
had any authority to waive the prior defaults of the plaint-
iff, or that there was any duty on the part of Mr. Straw at 
that time to deliver any abstracts to the plaintiff or his 
attorney. Prior to that time the agreement had been nul-
lified, and the possession of the property had been de-
manded. The statement made that the plaintiff had a 
good faith purcha~er is not in any sense a tender. Cer-
tainly, before that time,· under the facts shown by the rec-
ord, the plaintiff had waived any right to have an abstract 
submitted as provided for in the original agreement, or t9 
have any further abstract submitted to him for examina-
tion than had already been done. 
This is shown by the authorities hereinbefore cited. 
Plaintiff had already examined the title to the prop-
erty, and had pointed out all of the defects, as hereinbe-
fore shown, and the only one he complained of now was the 
defect in the failure to have the one-fifth interest of the 
lands in Section 2 deeded to the administratrix of the Kelly 
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estate, and a deed from the administratrix of the Kelly 
estate to the four-fifths interest of the lands contained in 
said Section 2. Under the conditions, it W?Uld seem that 
there was no duty on the part of said executors to have 
said conveyances completed at that time, or at any time, 
as far as the plaintiff was concerned, until he was pre-
pared to make payment, if at all. 
27 R. C. L., Sections 245, 517, cases cited 
Silfvast vs. Asplund, et al, 20 Pac. (2nd) 631 
The defendants, Rachel H. Jolley, and the executors 
of the R. G. Jolley estate, doubtless hoping that the plaint-
iff had a good faith purchaser, as stated by him, immedi-
ately proceeded to get the necessary deeds executed and 
delivered, the order authorizing the execution of said deeds 
having long theretofore been granted, which was done, 
and the deeds duly recorded, on July 28, 1937. (Trans. 
39-43.) 
Thereafter, to-wit, on August 16, 1937, further notice 
was served upon the plaintiff by said defendants above 
named, advising of the defaults, and requesting payment 
of the amounts due, and giving him thirty days in which 
to bring up such defaults, and further advising the plaintiff 
that said defendants were ready, able and willing to com-
ply with all of the requirements of the agreement on their 
part, upon payment being rnade. 
The record shows that the plaintiff wholly disregarded 
said notice, and, thereafter, the defendants, on September 
17, 1937, again declared the agreement terminated and de-
lnanded possession, which notice was served upon the 
plaintiff; the plaintiff did nothing, not even indicating a 
desire to have a further extension, whereupon the defend-
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ants took possession of the premises as hereinbefore 
stated. 
It seems that it \vould be useless to multiply authori-
ties under this state of facts. 
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS TO BE ENTITLED TO 
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION 
There is one other matter, however, that should be 
noticed. 
The appellant, in his brief, asked for the equitable 
consideration of the Court, upon the ground that appel-
lant had paid bet\veen $4,000.00 and $5,000.00 upon the 
purchase price of $8,000.00, and had signed a contract 
waiving the conveyance of 93.87 acres, without any con-
sideration. The record, of course, does not show whether 
there was any consideration paid for that relinquishment, 
or \Vhether it was by inadvertence that the description of 
the property in the original agreement did not disclose that 
only four-fifths interest of said property was owned by Mr. 
Jolley, but it is clear that there was some sufficient reason 
for that relinquishment, although that reason may not ap-
pear in the record, there is no basis on that account for 
any appeal to a court of equity, in view of the other mat-
t2rs that do appear from this record. 
It does appear from this record that the plaintiff was 
in default under the original contract to the amount of 
$1,560.00, which should have been paid on November 30, 
1931, and was not paid. 
It further appears by the record that after the pay-
ments made on January 28, 1932, and the ·$300.00 paid a 
few days thereafter, in conformity with the agreement 
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entered into on that date, that plaintiff, during all of the 
time until June 4 1937 when he apeared with Attorney 
' ' Stringfellow and asked for the abstract, had paid only ap-
proximately $1,000.00 towards the payment of principal 
and interest, when he should have paid more than $6,000.00. 
That, in addition thereto, he had defaulted in the pay-
ment of the taxes, assessments, and insurance and interest 
thereon, amounting to approximately $1,000.00. 
And that, in addition thereto, he had had possession 
of the property for eight producing years, when according 
to the record, the farming part of the property was worth 
approximately $~,200.00 a year. At least, that is the 
amount he received from the Japs in 1937, and if that year 
was a usual year, he 'vould have received an income of 
$9,600.00. What he received from the grazing lands, 
forming a major part, is not disclosed. However, the rec-
ord does show that he received $75.00 from the Cattle 
Association for permitting them to trail their cattle across 
these premises for one year. All this income was received 
by him, without a payment of a dollar in taxes, water as-
sessments, and insurance on the buildings, except for one 
or two years, perhaps 1930 and 1931. 
In vie\v of this situation, he now appeals to this Court 
on equitable grounds, and claims his right to be repaid all 
that he had paid on the contract, including interest at the 
rate of eight per cent per annum from the dates of pay-
ment, and, in addition thereto, to be paid for all alleged 
improvements made by him upon said property, amounting 
to the sum of $2,591.00, and asks also to be paid $1,000.00 
for which he had a judgment against the Jap, balance of 
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the lease of 1937, under which said Jap farmed a part~on 
of the premises in question. 
The equities are certainly not with the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
THE ACTION OF THE COURT IN GRANTING A NON-
SUIT WAS PROPER UNDER THE FACTS IN THIS 
CASE. 
There is no substantial dispute in the evidence before 
the Court, bearing upon the propriety of the Court granting 
the Motion of Non-Suit-any evidence, with respect to the 
damages, of course, being admitted, if the defendants were 
justified in terminating the agreement of sale and taking 
possession of the premises. 
The original agreement, Exhibit " A," stipulated, with 
re.:::pect to the right to terminate the agreement and de-
cla!:e a forfeiture as follows: 
"Second Party to have possession and the use, 
benefit and rentals of said property, February 19, 
1930, and thereafter, so long as he complies with the 
terms of this agreement, but upon a failure to comply 
with the same, his rights to possession will terminate, 
and the payments made may, at the option of the par-
ties of the First Part, be declared forfeited, and this 
agreement shall be null and void; 60 days grace is 
hereby given." 
This original agreement was modified by agreements 
designated Exhibits "B" and "C," made on January 28, 
1932, and defaults theretofore waived, and the payments 
p2st due as of November 30, 1931 agreed upon, and the 
amount agreed upon paid on that date, except the sum of 
$300.00, \vhich was to be paid upon an abstract of title 
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showing certain deeds to be obtained and exhibited to the 
plaintiff and appellant, and, if satisfactory, said $300.00 to 
be paid by the plaintiff and appellant. 
It was admitted by the plaintiff and appellant, as here-
inbefore set out, that said abstract was delivered to him 
and examined and found satisfactory, and he thereupon 
paid the $300.00. 
The next payment under the said agreement, Exhibit 
"A," fell due November 30, 1932, and amounted to 
$1,000.00 in principal and $300.00 interest, and the taxes 
and assessments for the year 1932 fell due at or about the 
same time. After November 30, 1932, the plaintiff and ap-
pellant was at all times in default as to principal, interest, 
taxes and assessments. While small payments were made 
from time to time until July 21, 1936, such payments never, 
at any time, equaled the interest due, say nothing about 
the principal; so that when the final payment under said 
contract, Exhibit " A," fell due on November 30, 1936, the 
plaintiff and appellant was in default in the amount of ap-
proximately $5,738.00 principal and interest, and in the 
payment of taxes and assessments, including interest and 
penalties, between $700.00 and $800.00, making the amount 
in default at that time approximately $6,500.00. 
More than 60 days after the last default mentioned 
above, plaintiff and appellant was served with notice that 
the defendants intended· to terminate the said agreement 
and declare forfeited the payments theretofore made, un-
less the plaintiff and appellant made up the entire amounts 
due under the said agreement, including principal and in-
terest, taxes, assessments and insurance. The plaintiff 
and appellant was notified that unless such delinquencies 
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\Vere paid \Vithin 45 days fron1 that time, possession of the 
property would be demanded, as hereinbefore set out in 
this brief. See Exhibit "D." 
The plaintiff and appellant not having taken any ac-
tion \vith respect to the demands of said notice, the de-
fendants herein gave notice of the termination of said 
agreement and of the forfeiture of the payments thereto-
fore made, and detnanded the possession of the property. 
See Exhibit "E." 
That thereafter, as hereinbefore set out in this brief, 
the plaintiff and appellant, having failed to make or tender 
payment, the defendants finally, on September 11, 1937, 
gave notice of the tern1ination of said agreement and de-
manded possession of the premises, and thereafter, in Oc-
tober, 1937, took possession of the premises as hereinbe-
fore fully set out. 
The defaults are admitted on the part of plaintiff and 
appellant, and the defense or answer put forward by the 
plaintiff is contained in his reply, filed after the commence-
meEt of the trial, and is as follows: 
"Except as admitted, this plaintiff denies the al-
legations of Paragraph 5, and affirmatively alleges 
that while said contract was in full force and effect, 
he demanded abstract of title, showing clear title to 
all of said property except 93.87 acres, referred to in 
Exhibit "B" attached to the defendants' answer here-
in, and was ready, able and willing to pay the total 
purchase- price of said property upon delivery to him 
of an abstract showing clear title thereto and a deed 
of conveyance thereof, and defendants failed and re-
fused to furnish such abstract or deed." 
. The only evidence produced by the plaintiff and ap-
pellant in support of that claim is that given by Attorney 
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J. W. Stringfellow, with respect to a conversation with M. 
R. Straw, attorney for the executors of the estate of R. G. 
Jolley, deceased, had at Provo, about June 4, 1937. There 
is nothing in the record that M. R. Straw, by reason of be-
ing the attorney for the executors of the estate of R. G. 
Jolley, deceased, had any authority to bind the defendants 
or to waive any rights that the defendants had under said 
contract. 
6 C. J., Section 146, Page 641. 
That evidence, even assuming that it is competent, 
shows conclusively that Frank S. Naylor was neither ready 
or able to pay any amount to Attorney Straw or anyone 
else, and this conversation hereinbefore referred to was 
had after Mr. Naylor had been notified of the termination 
of said agreement on account of his prior defaults. 
(Trans. 54; 98-100.) 
It seems apparent from the conversation had between 
Attorney Stringfellow and Attorney Straw, on or about 
June 4, 1937, that the plaintiff knew that he could not pay 
as alleged, and, furthermore, that he did not intend to pay, 
as he said he was ready and able to do, ·and, from later de· 
velopments, the conclusion is justified that the purpose of 
the request for an abstract at that time was to lay a foun-
dation for some action on the part of the plaintiff. 
The letter written by Attorney Straw to Stringfellow, 
dated June 4, 1937, plaintiff's Exhibit " D," indicated that 
if Naylor had a bona fide purchaser, that the abstract 
could be examined at Provo for the purpose· of determining 
the title to the lands under contract, and that if it were 
possible for Naylor to make any deal that would clear up 
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the matter. he would have Mr. Straw's assistance to facili!" 
tate such action! 
No further contact with Attorney Straw, or with the 
defendants, was made after June 4, 1937, although, on Aug-
ust 16, 1937. notice was served upon the plaintiff and ap-
pellant that the defendants at that time were ready, able 
and \villing to complete the transaction, and make the 
necessary transfers of the property, as provided by the 
terms of the agreement, and that that would be done at any 
time during said 30-day period, upon tender of the amount 
due as provided by the terms of the agreement of sale. 
This notice was completely ignored, and nothing fur-
ther was heard from Mr. Naylor by the defendants until 
the suit \vas brought as hereinabove stated. 
The plaintiff and appellant, having therefore admitted 
all of the defaults alleged by the defendants, and having 
wholly failed to make any tender or offer of payment· suf-
ficient under the law as hereinabove referred to, to excuse 
such performance, we respectfully submit that the trial 
court was fully warranted in granting the non-suit. 
We therefore respectfully urge that the action of the 
trial court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON AND CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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